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JAMES P. CAVIN
OFFICE OF STATISTICAL STANDARDS, BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
A. INTRODUCTION
Tms paper reviews a number of economic projections which have
been made by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the
United States Department of Agriculture during the postwar
period. I shall describe briefly the nature and purpose of these
projections, summarize the methods used, and discuss a few of
the problems involved.
Agriculture is only a segment of the national economy, but an
important one. Net income from agriculture usually represents
about 10 percent of total national income; about 18 percent of
the population of the United States lives on farms; agricultural
exports usually account for 25to30 percent of total exports; and
American consumers spend over 35 percent of their total dis-
posable income on such agricultural products as food, clothing,
and tobacco.
The field of agricultural economics has traditionally been sepa-
rated from the main body of economic analysis. The artificial
character of this separation shows up sharply when long-term
projections of the national product are under consideration. On
the one hand, the agricultural economist becomes involved in
many of the problems of population, labor force, productivity, the
cost-wage-price structure, money supply, and the consumption
function that confront the more general analyst. On the other
hand, the general analyst must employ reasonable assumptions
about the agricultural labor force, agricultural production, farm
income, the prices of farm commodities, and the consumption of
food, or some of his more general projections may become dis-
torted.
This is not to imply that there is no room for specialization.
The agricultural analyst, for example, needs a more detailed set
Note: The assignment to prepare this paper was undertaken while the
author was head of the Division of Statistical and Historical Research,
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, and com-
pleted while he was, as he is now, a member of the staff of the Office of
Statistical Standards, Bureau of the Budget. It does not necessarily represent
the views of either agency.
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of projections for the agricultural segment than for the non-
agricultural segment; while the reverse is true for the analyst
specializing in problems of commerce, industry, or labor. Never-
theless, projective analyses, even with specialized objectives, must
reckon with many factors whose influences permeate the entire
economy.
B. LONG-RUN PROJECTIONS
The Bureau of Agricultural Economics has published two sets of
relatively long-run projections for agriculture. The first appeared
in a series of bulletins published in 1945 entitled What Peace
Can Mean to American Farmers. The actual analysis was done
largely in 1944, and the projections were for the year 1950. The
second, published in 1948, was A Study of Selected Trends' and
Factors Relating to the Long-Run Prospect for American Agri-
culture, prepared for the Committee on Agriculture of the House
of Representatives. The analysis was done in 1947 and the pro-
jections were for a postwar period described as being about 1955-
65, with some selected trends projected to 1975. This study is
usually called the "Hope Report." This was not due to any wish-
ful character, but to the fact that the request for its preparation
came from the Hon. Clifford Hope, chairman of the House Agri-
culture Committee. We are now working on projective analyses
in connection with river valley developments, flood control, soil
conservation, and the activities of various agricultural lending
agencies, all of which require consideration of whether future
economic returns will justify current investment costs.
Before analyzing our longer-term projections, I shall dwell
briefly on our outlook work. Each fall we make systematic ap-
praisals of the economic prospects for agriculture during the
coming calendar year. This work has been described elsewhere
in some detail.1 Our work on longer-term projections grew out
of these efforts at short-term forecasting, and to some extent a
common methodology is employed.
C. SHORT-TERM APPRAISALS
In making our short-term appraisals, we first estimate the levels
of domestic and foreign demand for farm products during the
1P. Cavin, "Forecasting the Demand for Agricultural Products," Agri-
cultural Economics Research (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), Vol. iv,
No. 3, July 1952, pp. 65-76.
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coming year. This requires an estimate of disposable income and
of the value of agricultural exports. From a number of sources
we develop forecasts of gross private investment, net foreign
investment, and government purchases of goods and services.
These forecasts provide an estimate of nonconsumption expendi-
tures from which we can estimate gross national product, personal
income, and disposable income.
From the GNP forecast, plus information about foreign aid
programs, we can estimate the anticipated value of agricultural
exports. Cash receipts from livestock, livestock products, and
crops marketed domestically can be estimated as a function of
disposable income; while cash receipts from export crops can
be estimated as a function of disposable income and the value
of agricultural exports.
From our knowledge of the quantity of livestock, feed supplies,
and crop conditions, we can estimate the probable level of farm
output and farm marketings. Given the latter, together with the
estimate of cash receipts, we can derive an estimate of the level
of prices received by farmers. Furthermore, because of the close
relationship between cash receipts and the realized net income
of farm operators, an estimate of the former will usually yield a
pretty fair estimate of the latter. I shall not try to give any of the
details involved in these estimates, except to say that linear rela-
tionships, fitted by least squares, are employed throughout.
In making our general forecasts of farm prices and income, we
do not rely exclusively on these over-all relationships. Our ana-
lysts specializing in the various commodity fields, who are re-
sponsible for outlook reports appraising the factors affecting the
prices of their respective commodities, provide us with inde-
pendent estimates of the prices and quantities involved, which
we can use to substantiate or modify the forecasts for the larger
aggregates.
Neither our short-term forecasts nor our longer-term projec-
tions hinge on any single method. We try to use and consolidate
all relevant knowledge. We examine long-time trends in produc-
tion, consumption, and technology; we employ various types of
statistical relationships; and we utilize the specialized knowledge
of commodity analysts, farm management experts, marketing
specialists, and the like. We continually try new hypotheses and
new statistical techniques, and attempt to bring within our grasp
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problems which we had to leave unsolved in earlier projective
efforts.
The ways in which our longer-range projections differ from
those employed in short-term forecasts are largely matters of
degree. As we move further into the future, we must rely increas-
ingly on long-time trends; relationships which are satisfactory
for measuring year-to-year changes must be modified in the light
of assumptions about the structure of the projected economy; and
problems which are of relatively small concern in the short run
assume greater importance when longer periods are considered.
For example, the problem of the general price level assumes
much greater significance in longer-run projections than it has
in the short-term outlook.
D. "WHAT PEACE CAN MEAN TO
AMERICAN FARMERS"
Between May and December 1945 the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics published four reports under thistitle.2 The first
described economic conditions likely to be associated with full
employment or various levels of unemployment during the post-
war years, and indicated probable effects of these different levels
on prices and incomes received by farmers. The second report
discussed the means of maintaining full employment, while the
third was concerned with means of expanding foreign trade. The
fourth report dealt with agricultural programs and policies
appropriate to alternative conditions of domestic economic ac-
tivity and foreign trade.
The first of these reports contains the first set of projections
with which this paper is concerned. The key projections in the
report are reproduced in Table 1. Their purpose was in large
measure an educational one. As stated in the introductions:
"If farm people are to help develop constructive programs in
the post-war period, they must understand their direct interest
in national and international economic decisions which of neces-
sity will be made at the close of this war—and understand the
more basic relations of agricultural affairs to over-all national
and international policies. The purpose of this analysis is to pro-
vide an aid to such understanding by describing the economic
2Departmentof Agriculture, Misc. Pub. 582, May 1945; 570, July 1945;
582, October 1945; 589, December 1945.
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TABLE 1
EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND PRicEs STATES, 1935-39 AVERAGE,

















Total labor forcea Million 53.8 62.6 60.0 60.0 60.0 •
























employment do. 34.0 44.1 48.0 42.5 32.0
Cross national productb Billion $ 81.9 187.8 188.0 130.0 76.5
National incomeb do. 65.4 149.4 150.0 105.0 57.5
Cash income from farm
marketings
Net income of farm
do. 8.0 19.2 17.0 12.5 6.5


















Parity ratio (prices re-
ceived vs. prices paid) do. 64.0 119.0 100.0 89.0 62.0
Wholesale prices, all




1935—39 100.0 106.0 118.0 110.0 100.0
index do. 100.0 129.0 135.0 125.0 115.0
a Revisionsin data resulted in some differences for these items from comparable items in
Table 8.
b Department of Commerce series as published prior to 1947. For differences between old
and new series see "National Income and Product Statistics of the United States
Supplement to Survey of Current Business, July 1947.
conditions likely to be associated with various degrees of employ-
ment and unemployment in the post-war period, and to indicate
the most probable effect of these conditions on the price-and-
income position of agriculture. The estimates presented are not
forecasts of what will happen after the war, but are intended to
illustrate what is most probable under stated alternative
tions with respect to employment, price levels, productivity of
labor, and related factors."
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1. Estimating procedures
To estimate the total labor force in 1950, we settled on an increase
of approximately 1 percent a year from the total labor force
reported by the Census for 1940. An allowance of 2 million per-
Sons was made for the armed forces and an additional 2 million
for frictional unemployment. These deductions gave a total civil-
ian employment of 56 million persons, of which we assigned 8
million to agriculture. This last was lower than the number em-
ployed in any prewar year, and was designed to allow for the
usual movement away from the farm during prosperity and for
continuing technological advance in agriculture.
The next step was the estimation of gross national product and
national income. These estimates were expressed in terms of the
general price level in 1943, as indicated by the average level of
the retail consumer price index.3 However, the agricultural com-
ponents were adjusted downward because prices received by
farmers in that year appeared to be about 15 percent above their
normal relationship with the general price level. A compensating
upward adjustment was made in the nonagricultural component.
Nonagricultural productivity levels in 1950 were estimated for
two principal groups: group A—consisting of mining, manufac-
turing, transportation, electric power and gas utilities, and con-
struction industries; and group B—consisting of wholesale and
retail trade, finance, government, personal and professional serv-
ices, and miscellaneous industries. Productivity per man-hour was
estimated by fitting straight-line trends to the productivity data
for each of the two groups. To obtain net income produced by
each group, it was necessary to estimate the proportions of the
48 million nonagricultural workers that would be employed in
the respective groups. For this purpose, we used the same pro-
portions that prevailed in the high-employment year of 1929.
This resulted in placing 20.6 million workers in group A and
27.6 million in group B.
An estimate of net real income produced by. each of these
groups in 1950 was obtained by multiplying the respective pro-
ductivity indexes by the corresponding percentage increases in
employment. These estimates of real net income were combined
and converted to a total in terms of 1943 prices. This total
amounted to approximately $134 billion. To this was added $2
8Consumers'price index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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billion for income produced by persons in the armed forces. On
the basis of its past relationship to nonagricultural net income,
agricultural net income was estimated at $14 billion. The sum of
these three estimates gave a national income of $150 billion and
a corresponding gross national product of $188 billion.
Given these over-all assumptions with respect to national
income and the general level of prices, price specialists in the
Bureau developed an integrated pattern of production, disap-
pearance, exports, imports, and prices for each of the principal
agricultural commodities. In making these projections,it was
further assumed that there would be no support-price or pro-
duction control programs (except the sugar quota system); that
exports would revert to approximately the prewar pattern; and
that high levels of employment would prevail in the principal
industrial countries of the world, Most of these individual com-
modity projections, including prices received by farmers, pro-
duction, and exports, were published in this first report.
Estimates of domestic disappearance and exports were con-
verted into equivalent farm marketings. Cash receipts from these
marketings were derived by multiplying quantities marketed by
corresponding estimates of prices received. The sum of the cash
receipts from all items totaled $16.7 billion, which was consistent
with the net-income-produced figure of $14 billion.
2. Checking estimates
Results of this general estimating process were subjected to cer-
tain cross-checks. The index of prices received by farmers, esti-
mated on the basis of past relationships between that index and
the consumer price index, approximately equaled the index
resulting from the summation of the individual farm price pro-
jections. The cash receipts estimate of $16.7 billion arrived at by
the summation process proved lower than the results given by
an over-all regression analysis, in which cash receipts were ex-
pressed as a function of national income and the value of agri-
cultural exports. This equation indicated a level of $18 billion.
However, since the multiplier effect on farm income which this
equation assigned to agricultural exports seemed suspiciously
large, we relied on the results obtained in the individual com-
modity analyses, and used a final cash receipts figure of $17
billion in the over-all model.
Estimates of domestic disappearance for food use at the farm
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level were checked, and in some instances modified, on the basis
of estimates of per capita consumption at the retail level. These
per capita estimates were obtained by a combination of two
approaches. First, a size distribution of the projected national
income was constructed. The projected population Was broken
down by income groups, and estimates of consumption by these
groups were obtained from income-group consumption data con-
tained in the consumer purchases studies of 1935-36 and
These were finally converted to estimated average consumption
per capita. Secondly, estimates of per capita consumption of
individual commodities were projected by time series analysis.
Consumption of meats, dairy products, fats and oils, and sugar
was estimated principally on the basis of correlation analyses in
which consumption was regarded as a function of retail prices
and per capita income. Consumption of other products, princi-
pally fruits, vegetables, and grains, was derived largely from long-
time trends. When estimates from the two approaches were com-
bined, they gave an index of per capita food consumption 18
percent above the 1935-39 level. This was consistent with a cor-
relation analysis in which the index of per capita consumption
of all foods was regarded as a function of disposable income per
capita and the ratio of food prices to nonfood prices at retail.
Furthermore, when the index of per capita food consumption
was converted to an index of total consumption, it was found to
be consistent with the index of total food production implicit in
the individual commodity production estimates.
Estimates of domestic disappearance for nonfood use at the
farm level were also checked by separate analyses, but it was not
possible to do this as thoroughly as for the food items. However,
the farm level projections for cotton and tobacco were fairly well
substantiated by estimates of cotton consumption at the mill level
and of cigarette consumption at the retail level. It was not pos-
sible to develop any definitive analysis of wool consumption.
Projections of livestock product consumption were checked
against projected feed supplies, prices, and trends in feeding
in order to achieve internal consistency for this im-
portant input-output relationship.
In this first report, similar estimates were made within the
Consumer Expenditures in the United States (National Resources Com-
mittee, 1939); and Spending and Saving of the Nation's Families in War-
time (Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bul. 723, 1943).
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agricultural segment under conditions of intermediate employ-
ment and of serious depression. The intermediate situation was
visualized as being analogous to the year 1941, and the serious
depression as analogous to something between the very low level
of 1982 and the average prewar level of 1985-89. The basic esti-
mating procedures within these lower level assumptions were
essentially the same as for the full-employment model.
In developing our projections for this report, we undertook to
discuss the several models with agricultural economists in various
sections of the country. A considerable number took rather strong
exception to our full-employment model, which they regarded as
improbable, if not fantastic. According to them, everyone knew
that full employment was an unattainable ideal and that some-
thing like the agricultural depression of the 1930's would certainly
reappear as soon as the war was oven Although we were not
attempting actually to forecast conditions in the year 1950, we
naturally hoped that it would turn out to be a year of approxi-
mately full employment. This would not only enable us to con-
found our critics, but, more important, would give us an oppor-
tunity of finding out whether or not we had been able to visualize
the nature of a full-employment postwar economy with any de-
gree of accuracy.
Unfortunately, the year 1950 was not ideally suited to this pur-
pose. Conditions in this year ranged from continued decline in
the economy during the first quarter, particularly with respect
to agricultural prices and income, to an inflationary boom in the
latter part of the year, arising out of the Korean situation. How-
ever, examination of quarterly data indicated that average condi-
tions prevailed in the second and third quarters, approximating a
full-employment situation not yet too seriously distorted by gov-
ernment expenditures for war purposes or by price inflation. Ac-
cordingly, I attempted to compare our 1950 projections made in
1944 with conditions as they existed in those two quarters con-
verted to an annual basis. I reconstructed the 1944 projections
using all original assumptions and relationships with the excep-
tion of the price level, where the actual indexes of consumer prices
and wholesale prices were used. I did not attempt to work out the
projection in all its commodity detail, but simply confined myself
to over-all relationships between national income, on the one
hand, and some of the principal items in the agricultural segment,
on the other. Results are given in Table 2.
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF 1950 FULL-EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS ADJUSTED TO 1950 PRICE LEVELS




UNIT OR Original for 1950 ON 2ND AND
ITEM BASE Pro jectionsaPrice Levelb3RD QUARTERS)
Total labor force Million 60.0 60.0 65.1
Armed forces do. 2.0 2.0 1.3
Total unemployment do. 2.0 2.0 3.0
Total civilian employment do. 58.0 56.0 60.8
Total agricultural
employment do. 8.0 8.0 8.1
Total nonagricultural









Cash income from farm
marketings






Prices received by farmers,
index
Aug. 1909—
July 1C14 165.0 238.0 256.0
Prices paid, interest, and
taxes, index do. 165.0 239.0 256.0










Food consumption, per capita,
index 1935—39 118.0 118.0 112.Oe
Agricultural production, index do. 135.0 135.0 137.Oe
a FromWhat Peace Can Mean to American Farmers, Department of Agriculture, Misc. Pub.
562, 570, 582, 589 (1945).
b 1950 projectkns calculated on same basis as in 1943, except for differences between actual
and assumed general price levels.
Including adjustment to bring these aggregates in line with Department of Commerce
income concepts.
d Not available on an annual rate basis. Approximated from estimates of volume of farm
marketings and prices received by farmers.
eActualestimate for calendar year 1950. Not available on part-year basis.
3. Comparison of estimates with actual
Our projections of farm employment, farm income, prices re-
ceived by farmers relative to prices paid, and the level of total
agricultural production were fairly good. The projected level of
food consumption was too high and our index of farm marketings,
116AGRICULTURE
which is not shown on this table, was too low relative to agri-
cultural production. Disparity between the projected and actual
situations was enhanced by the fact that agricultural exports in
1950 continued unusually high because of government aid pro-
grams, while the very considerable error in the population and
labor force projections had pervasive influences on the estimates
of the 1950 economy level which are very difficult to untangle.
For example, there was no way of knowing offhand just how
much of the miscalculation of the level of per capita consumption
was due to population increase, how much to retarding factors
in the production of meat, and how much to fundamental errors
in the statistical relationships used in forecasting the consumption
of food. I do not believe there is any point in pressing the com-
parison between actual and projected conditions much further.
I shall leave the grading of this exercise to disinterested observers.
E. AGRICULTURE LOOKS AHEAD
There are both important differences and important similarities
between the Hope Report and WhatPeaceCan Mean to Ameri-
can Farmers. Although both studies contain projections of the
economic condition of agriculture under various levels of eco-
nomic activity, the Hope Report took the position that "in general
it appears reasonable to expect a relatively high level of employ-
ment over the 25 years ahead" and that "the prospect for Amen-
can agriculture over the next quarter century is relatively good"
(p. 3). In analyzing the long-time prospects in this second re-
port, we distinguished between certain long-run trends, which
appeared to be of a rather stable nature, and certain variable
factors, whose future behavior is more conjectural. Further com-
ments on differences between the two reports will be made at
the end of this section.
1. Long-run trends
With respect to long-run trends, we visualized a steady growth in
the national economy as a whole. This growth is the result of
upward trends in total population, labor force, and productivity
per worker. The trend analysis of population is shown in Chart 1.
On the basis of trends in gross national product per worker from
1880 to 1930, we concluded that the long-time trend in produc-
tivity per worker probably lay within the range of 1.5 to 2 per-
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cent a year. Assuming a population in 1975 midway between the
high and medium projections in Chart 1 (that is, 174 million
persons), a labor force of about 71 million, and—to avoidexag-
gerating the long-time trend—an average increase in productivity
CHART J











1910 '20 '30 '40 '50 '60 '70 '80
Basic total are from the Bureau of the Census.
High projection based on high birth rates, low death rates, 200,000 annual net immigration.
Medium projection based on medium birth rates and death rates, no net immigration.
perworker of 1.5 percent a year, we derived a long-time trend
for the gross national product. The comparable trend for dis-
posable income in 1935-39 dollars is shown by the upper trend
line in Chart 2.
Wealso visualized a long-time upward trend in farm output,
despite a continued downward trend in farm population. The
trend in farm population is shown in Chart 3, while the trend in
farm output, associated with a projected high level of economic
activity, is shown in Chart 4. Even with a declining farm popu-
lation, it appears that agricultural production will continue to
rise. Long-time upward trends in farm mechanization, production
per unit of breeding livestock, and crop yields per acre were
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1910 '20 '30 '40 '50 '60 '70
Disposable personal income in current dollars deflated by Bureau of Labor Statistics index
of consumer prices.
assumedto be continuing agricultural characteristics. The in-
creased crop yields were predicated on trends in fertilizer input,
soil-conserving and soil-building practices, and the substitution
of new land—created by drainage, irrigation, and clearing—for
old land retired from cultivation. It should be noted here that the
long-time projection of total farm output was based not only on
analysis of trends in time series but also on a cooperative study
carried out by the land-grant colleges and the United States De-
partment of Agriculture. Assuming average weather and rela-
tively favorable prices for farm products, committees in each
state estimated what improved farm practicesit would pay
farmers to adopt and what the effects would be on crop yields.AGRICULTURE
CHART3
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o 1942-46 average output odlusted for above average weather.
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In addition, analysis was made of trends in farm costs, market-
ing costs, and food consumption. This report also discussed the
continuing trends toward fewer and larger commercial farms,
toward more part-time farms and rural residences, and toward
the urbanization of rural life.
Following this presentation of selected long-run trends, we
discussed what appeared to be the more variable factors—em-
ployment, the general price level, and the foreign demand for
agricultural products—and presented a set of projections based
on a number of alternative assumptions as to the general level
of economic activity. These projections are given in Table 3, and
apply to the decade centering on 1960.
The high-employment level in this model was based primarily
on the trends selected as likely to be predominating influences
over the next 25 years. It represents what was in our judgment
the most probable economic environment in which agriculture
would find itself in the long-run period. This is in contrast to the
projections in What Peace Can Mean to American Farmers, where
we did not attempt to determine which of the alternative situa-
tions calculated for the year 1950 was likely to prevail.
2. Other problems
Beside incorporating these long-time trends into the high-em-
ployment model, we dealt also with problems of the general level
of prices, and the relation of farm prices and incomes to nonfarm
prices and incomes.
It appeared to us that 1947 was characterized by a degree of
price inflation that would not persist. Nonfood prices were mark-
edly above their past relation to unit labor costs. We felt it advis-
able to bring this relationship back in line. After allowing for
some further increase in wage rates during 1947, we assumed that
the general price level would gradually adjust itself downward
during the 1950's, with prospective increases in productivity per
worker being about equally divided between increases in money
wage rates and decreases in prices. We felt, therefore, that prices
in the long-run postwar period under conditions of high employ-
ment would be something like 40 to 50 percent above 1935-39,
but perhaps as much as 10 percent below those which prevailed
in 1947. This was obviously a tentative approach to the long-run
price level problem, but it did seem desirable to get away from
the price abnormalities of the year 1947. Since then, the Bureau
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TABLE S
EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1935-39 AVERAGE, 1947,








ITEM BASE AVERAGELIMINARYment LevelDepression
Total population Million 129.0 144.0 158 154 154
Total labor force do. 54.3 61.6 66 66 66
Employment do. 44.9 59.5 62 58 53
Unemployment do. 9.4 2.1 4 8 13
Cross national product Billion $ 84.0 231.8 265 205 165
Disposable income do. 66.2 175.6 200 155 130
Cash receipts from farm
marketings
Realized net income of
do. 8.0 30.0 23 17 11
farm operators do. 4.8a 18.Oa 14 9 6
Net farm income to all
farm peopleb do. 5•4a 20.Oa 16 11 7
Consumer prices, index 1935—39 100 159 145 125 115
Wholesale prices, index 1926 81 152 125 105 85
Prices received by farmers,
index 1910—14 107 278 200 150 100
Prices paid by farmers,c
index do. 128 231 200 175 150
Ratio of prices received
to prices paide do. 84 120 100 85 67
Farm output, index













b Net income accruing from agriculture to all farm people,. including farm laborers living on
farms. Includes value of farm products consumed in the farm household and the rental value
of the farm dwelling.
Index of prices and rates paid by farmers, including allowance for interest and taxes.
d Probably exceeds, by small amounts, quantities marketable through normal channels at
relative price levels specified.
of Agricultu:al Economics has given further attention to the price
level problem involved in long-term projections.
We also faced the problem of agricultural prices and incomes
in relation to nonagricultural prices and incomes. Although his-
torical relationships between farm prices and income, on the one
hand, and other economic variables, on the other hand, have
given quite satisfactory results for short periods, there was doubt
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as to their reliability for making long-run projections at levels
of population and national income far beyond anything previously
experienced. Unqualified use of these relationships gave fore-
casts of farm prices and incomes that appeared high. After tak-
ing into consideration the long-time downward trend in agri-
cultural income as a percentage of national income, and intro-
ducmg the assumption that under full employment the per
capita income of persons on commercial farms would be roughly
equivalent to incomes of persons not on farms, we found our-
selves obliged to make decisions within a range. For a number
of important agricultural series, these ranges were as follows:
cash receipts from farm marketings, $23 to 26 billion; prices
received by farmers, 200 to 220 (1910-14 =100);and a parity
ratio of 100 to 106. A conservative choice was made in this mat-
ter, with weight being given to the uncertainty in export pros-
pects, the possibility that the long-time trend in farm output may
have been understated, and the further possibility that estimated
per capita demand for food (as indicated by the index of average
per capita food consumption) may have been too high. Events
before Korea gave some indication that this conservatism may
have been justified. Farm production had been running higher
than the trend projections made in 1947 indicated, while farm
prices had declined from a level of 306 in January 1948 to 233
in December 1949.
The parity ratio (the relation between the indexes of prices
received and prices paid by farmers) was equal to 100 in both
of these reports. Regardless of what one may think of the parity
index as a means of determining individual commodity prices in
connection with support-price and related farm programs, the
parity ratio is a good statistical indicator of the general price
position of agriculture relative to that of the rest of the economy
of the United States. This ratio tends to fall well below 100 when
the economy is operating under conditions of substantially less
than full employment, to be fairly close to parity under conditions
of full employment, and to move well above parity when there
are abnormally large demands for agricultural products, such as
developed during World War II and during the postwar period,
when the demands arising out of foreign relief and reconstruc-
tion programs were added to the full-employment, demands of
the domestic economy.
I wish to emphasize that parity ratios in the two BAE reports
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were products of the projection process, rather than governing
assumptions used in making the projections. However, the parity
ratio used in the Hope Report might well have been anywhere
within the range of 100-106 percent of parity. It was the con-
scious choice of a relatively conservative position with respect
to the long-range agricultural price projections that resulted in
the use of the lower figure.
In addition to the high or most probable level, this model also
analyzes an average level and a depression level. These were con-
structed partly in recognition of the fact that a number of agri-
cultural economists are much less optimistic about the long-run
economic prospects for agriculture than the BAE, and partly to
illustrate the effect of large variations from the high-employment
level. The latter constitutes the basic long-run projection of this
report.
Projections for the average level assume that the economy will
perform about as well as it did in the interwar period 1920-40.
They assume also that the pattern of employment and prices
would affect the basic trends envisioned in the high-employment
model. Population and labor force would increase somewhat less
rapidly; the annual increase in productivity per worker would
drop to 1 percent a year; and agricultural production would ex-
pand at a slightly slower rate. Given lower levels of employment
and output, prices would be expected to drop. This is illustrated
by a decline of 14 percent in the consumer price index below the
high-employment level.Agricultural prices and incomes are
adjusted downward accordingly, showing their characteristic
tendency to decline further than nonagricultural prices and in-
comes when the general level of economic activity drops. The
general relation between this intermediate model and the high-
employment level can be seen from the consumer disposable
income projections in Chart 2.
This average level is regarded as a highly unstable situation.
The depression model is designed to illustrate the type of cyclical
drop that might occur if the economy lacked the basic strength
to maintain itself at the high-employment level. The drastic
assumptions used in this model are evident from an examination
of the last column in Table 3.
I return now to certain differences between the projections in
What Peace Can Mean to American Farmers and those in the
Hope Report. The first report set out some alternative economic
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possibilities for agriculture during the postwar period, together
with suggestions of national policies that might serve to maintain
full employment, and suggestions of appropriate agricultural
policies under conditions of both full employment and under-
employment. Projections in the Hope Report were focused on a
more distant period and represented the Bureau's judgment as
to which of the several alternatives was the most probable. The
greater definiteness of the Hope Report arose out of the nature
of the original request which the House Committee on Agricul-
ture made to the Bureau. As Congressman Hope said in the
Foreword to the report, "the committee felt that it would be
helpful in its consideration of proposals for a long-time program
to have before it the considered judgment of agricultural econ-
omists as to the major economic factors which may affect agri-
cultural production, consumption, and prices for the next 25
years.
In some respects the projections in the first report were more
complex than those in the second. They involved greater com-
modity detail, and a considerable effort was made to obtain
consistency among all the individual commodity components
and the larger aggregates. The second report was basically more
aggregative, and contained fewer individual commodity projec-
tions. On the other hand, this report represented a greater effort
to ascertain the likelihood that long-time trends would be con-
tinued or modified. A particular effort was made to arrive at a
consensus as to the implication of these trends for the long-run
outlook for agriculture.
It is impossible to say how "good" the projections in the Hope
Report are. The Bureau has made a number of recalculations
assuming a considerably larger population, and a somewhat
higher level of total farm output and of prices generally. These
adjustments, however, have not caused us to alter our views on
the long-run prospects for agriculture, except perhaps in strength-
ening our conviction that the projection of a relatively high level
of farm prices and incomes is justified.
F. CURRENT PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURAL
PROJECTIONS
Despite the difficulties and hazards inherent in long-run projec-
tions, there are definite needs for them in the field of agricul-
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ture. Many programs affecting agriculture must be based on
long-run considerations, and some attempt has to be made to
formulate a framework of economic expectations. This is par-
ticularly true for such programs as flood control, forestry, and
valley development, which require large-scale capital invest-
ments, and in which comparisons have to be made between cur-
rent costs of these investments and the economic benefits which
are expected to accrue. Projections are also becoming increasingly
useful to agencies making repayable loans to farmers on a long-
term basis. The abnormal conditions affecting agricultural prices
over the past 20 years have rendered historical base periods less
and less satisfactory as assumptions to be used in the develop-
ment of lending standards. As a result there is an increasing
tendency to employ projections of alternative future price situa-
tions for this purpose.
Because of this interest in long-run projections, the BAE has
continued to work in this field. Its efforts have consisted, first,.
of more detailed projections, particularly for individual com-
modity prices, within the framework of the Hope Report; and
secondly, of further analytic work on the general problem of
long-run projections. The rest of this paper will be concerned
with the latter.
Daly's study (the next paper in this volume) can properly be
regarded as an extension and elaboration of the projection tech-
niques employed in the Hope Report. from the fact that
his analyses center on the year 1970, as contrasted with 1955-65
in the earlier study, the principal new features are: (1) the con-
struction of an index of total utilization of farm products, consist-
ing of total domestic use of food plus total domestic use of non-
food commodities; (2) a more integrated analysis of the factors
affecting food consumption over time; (3) a more searching
analysis of the long-run influences affecting the proportion of
gross national product and national income resulting from agri-
cultural output; and (4) an explicit attempt to predict the be-
havior of the general price level during a prolonged period of
full employment.
The construction of the index of total utilization of agricultural
products, together with an over-all adjustment for net exports,
permits a more direct, simpler comparison between projected
total demand for farm products and projected total output than
was achieved in the two previous BAE 'projections.
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Daly projects a per capita food consumption index of 117
(1985-39 = 100), compared with 121 in the Hope Report. The
analyses underlying this projection bear out the belief that the
projected level of per capita food consumption in the Hope
Report was somewhat on the high side and that the index of 118
used in What Peace Can Mean to American Farmers was closer
to the long-time full-employment level. However, the problem of
the long-run level of food consumption has not yet been satis-
factorily solved. Still in doubt are the effects of new dynamic
elements—notably a continuing population shift from rural to
urban areas, increased processing and preparation of food outside
the home, and a rapidly rising population, bringing marked
changes in age distribution.5 Large changes on the production
side, particularly for meat, can have a significant influence on the
level of food consumption as a whole. Furthermore, our statistical
measures of food consumption and expenditures are still imper-
fect. Significant discrepancies between the BAE index of per
capita food consumption and the estimates of consumer expendi-
tures for food of the Department of Commerce need to be
reconciled.
Daly's analysis of trends in trade between agriculture and the
rest of the economy represents a more thorough exploration of
this problem than was attempted in the Hope Report. It provides
a firmer base for the final projection of farm output, prices re-
ceived by farmers, and farm income than was available at the
time when the earlier report was prepared.
The 1950 projections in What Peace Can Mean to American
Farmers were in terms of the 1943 price level. The Hope Report
assimied some contraction from the high prices prevailing in 1947,
followed by a gradual downward adjustment in the general price
level during the 1950's. Daly has attempted to deal more defin-
itively with the long-run price level problem. Because of space
limitations, his approach receives only brief treatment as now
printed. It is therefore appropriate to summarize the essential
steps involved. The core of his method was to examine trends in
prices, total money supply, physical output, and money balances,
in relation to gross national product in current dollars. This
For a careful analysis of the postwar demand for food, see Marguerite
C. Burk, "A Study of Recent Relationships between Income and Food
Expenditures," Agricultural Economics Research (Bureau of Agricultural
Economics), Vol. m, No. 3, July 1951, pp. 87-97.
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analysis indicated a secular rise in the general price level. Daly
did not accept the price level projection yielded by the trend
analysis until he had examined the long-run relation of money
wage rates to output, and had concluded that the economy has
become increasingly resistant to severe price deflation. This in-
volved an examination of the influence of political forces and of
changes in our financial institutions on the general price level.
Projected to 1970, his analysis indicated a price level about 30
percent higher than the one assumed in the Hope Report.
analysis is like the Hope Report, which attempted to
deal explicitly with the long-run price level problem, rather than
to follow the traditional method of using constant prices in the
construction of a projected economic model. The essential reason
for such a bold venture is the fact that the BAE projections have
had a strong policy motivation. Demand for such projections has
arisen as a result of long-range agricultural programs involving
heavy financial commitments and requiring the adoption of
assumptions as to the probable level of prices and incomes during
the period when the fruits of these commitments will be realized.
Despite the careful analysis made by Daly and the general plausi-
bility of his findings, it is impossible to say whether his projected
price level has any greater or less validity than the relatively con-
servative level projected in the Hope Report. I believe that his
thesis of a gradual long-time rise in the price level under condi-
tions of full employment is a better one than the assumption of a
moderate decline adopted in the Hope Report. However, in view
of the erratic behavior of farm prices since World War I, the
disposition of the Department of Agriculture to take a relatively
cautious position with respect to the long-run price level is under-
standable.
Although the final projections of the general level of prices, as
well as those of prices received and paid by farmers, are consider-
ably higher in Daly's study than in the Hope Report, the rela-
tionship between prices received and prices paid (the parity
ratio) remains within the Hope Report range of 100 to 105. This
indicates that the judgment of the BAE concerning the relative
position of agriculture in a future high-level economy has not
been fundamentally altered.6 The projected farm income figures
6Sincethis present paper was written, however, there have been indica-
tions that the continuance of rapid technological change in agricultural pro-
duction, together with the impact of the Korean inflation on the farm cost
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in the Daly model are substantially higher than in the Hope
Report, due to the assumption of both a rising price level and a
larger farm output. However, they represent a somewhat lower
share of total national income because of the assumption that the
historical decline in the agricultural share will still be character-
istic of the economy in 1970, which is considerably further out
in time than the dates for the income projections in the Hope
Report.
G. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The projection process followed in the Hope Report and carried
forward by Daly can be summarized in a general fashion. Atten-
tion is first centered on trends that might be regarded as exog-
enous as far as agriculture is concerned, such as population,
labor force, productivity, and the general price level. On the basis
of these trends, there is projected a framework for the economy
as a whole, consisting of a few large aggregates such as gross
national product, national income, and a general price index.
Secondly, trends are projected for a considerable number of
variables within the agricultural segment, giving weight not only
to observable long-time movements in the variables themselves,
but also to the influences which the projected framework for the
economy as a whole might be expected to exert on these move-
ments. When trend projections for the more important compo-
nents of the agricultural segment are given, an attempt is made
to establish a rough equilibrium between agriculture and the
rest of the economy. In establishing this equilibrium, certain his-
torical relationships are utilized (arrived at by single equation
methods), but their utilization is subject to modification on the
basis of any evident trends in these relationships or on the basis
of any other knowledge which appears to indicate that changes
can be expected during a lengthy time period. Finally, an attempt
is made to establish a more precise equilibrium within agricul-
ture itself, partly by checking projections for individual com-
modities against projections for aggregates containing these com-
modities, and partly by analyzing the consistency of the input-
output relationships that the agricultural projections imply.
The foregoing process of formulating long-range projections in
structure, may result in a ratio of prices received to prices paid closer to 95
than to 100, even under conditions of full employment.
129I'
AGRICULTURE
agriculture can hardly be described as a method, in the sense of
consisting of a definite number of steps, taken in unvarying
sequence, and employing a fixed set of statistical relationships. It
does, however, involve the use of an enormous amount of quan-
titative data and scores of statistical relationships. More im-
portantly, it is a synthesis of the economic judgment of a large
number of trained and experienced analysts concerned with prac-
tically every field within the economics of agriculture.
In concluding, I should like to emphasize again the difference
between our projections for the economy as a whole and those
for agriculture as such. We feel rather confident that, given a
set of over-all projections, we can construct a reasonably good
set of projections for agriculture. But unless our framework pro-
jections are good, our agricultural projections will be defective.
Future progress in our projective efforts will in very large degree
depend on the development of satisfactory methods for project-
ing those large critical components which determine the general
level of employment, output, and income. It is relatively easy
for us to make agricultural projections under various alternative
assumptions of the general level of economic activity, but the
payoff comes when one has to indicate which of the several
alternatives is the one most likely to prevail. So far, we have
leaned in the direction of thinking that our employment"
projections represent the most probable course of economic devel-
opment in this country over the next 25 years or so, and we hope
that the projectors of population, productivity, capital formation,
and the like will bear us out.
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